We consider a team production problem in which the principal observes only the team output and not individual effort. As is well known, inefficiencies may arise when the principal signs bilateral contracts with each agent separately, as is often the case in practice. In our model, where each team member's compensation is based only on his individual action, and team members are not penalized nor rewarded as a group, we show that it is possible to overcome the problem of inefficiency by specifying in the agents' job assignments that each member should monitor and report the actions of his teammates. We show that even though equilibrium job assignments include monitoring, this serves only to provide incentives for effort-agents do not engage in wasteful monitoring in equilibrium. It is remarkable that the first-best is achieved in equilibrium (high effort and no monitoring) even though it cannot be achieved if the principal assigns high effort and no monitoring. In other words, the first-best can only be achieved by assigning second-best actions.
Introduction
Firms often organize their employees into teams. For example, microprocessor manufacturer Intel Corporation divides its design engineers into separate teams, with each assigned to complete one component of a microprocessor. In team problems, the output depends on all agents' choices, but it may be difficult for a principal to identify the actions taken by each individual agent. As is well known, inefficiencies may arise when the principal signs bilateral contracts with each agent separately (see for example Segal (1999 Segal ( , 2003 and Prat and Rustichini (2003) ). Each team member's compensation is based only on his individual action, so that team members are not penalized or rewarded as a group, as is often the case in practice. In particular, joint penalties based on team rather than individual work may be illegal or ruled out by company or union policies. 1 And a system of joint rewards may be more expensive or less effective than a compensation system based on individual effort. 2 Finally, even in environments in which joint penalties and rewards are feasible, they may be insufficient to induce efficient individual effort.
In this paper, we show that it is possible to overcome the inefficiency associated with this team problem by specifying in the agents' job assignments that each member should work hard in the joint production and monitor and report the actions of his teammates. We show that even though equilibrium job assignments include monitoring, this serves only to provide incentives for effort-agents do not engage in wasteful monitoring in equilibrium. The agents violate the principal's assignment in equilibrium, but in violating it, they allow the first-best to be achieved.
It is remarkable that the first-best is achieved in equilibrium (high effort and no monitoring) even though it cannot be achieved if the principal assigns high effort and no monitoring, because without the threat of monitoring, agents choose low effort. In other words, the first-best can only be achieved by assigning second-best actions.
Even though team-level penalties and rewards are not considered, the inclusion of the monitoring requirement in the agents' job assignments effectively makes each agent responsible for the actions of all other agents, and hence reinforces incentives to work hard. Suppose that the principal instructs agents to work hard and to monitor one another. As long as output is high, there is no evidence that any agent failed to monitor. But if output is low and an agent is unable to produce a report of shirking by others, then it is verifiable that the agent either shirked himself or failed to blow the whistle on the shirking agents. As this verifies that he did not fulfill his assignment, the agent can be penalized. This makes each agent unwilling to shirk in providing productive effort. In contrast, if the principal does not include monitoring in the agents' assignments, then if output is low, the principal cannot verify whether any given agent fulfilled his assignment.
In many business settings, supervisors ask that employees evaluate the performance of their peers, especially when the employees work as a team. If taken seriously, such evaluations can be costly to produce, but our results suggest that even if they are taken lightly, they can be a valuable part of workers' incentives to exert productive effort. For example, at Intel Corporation, a new microprocessor is divided into "blocks" and a team of people is assigned to complete each block.
Intel gives the team a great deal of flexibility as to how to organize work on the block and relies on team members monitoring the progress of the other team members. As another example, the Boston Consulting Group's (BCG) recruiting brochure "Insight" (2002) describes the importance and emphasis on teamwork at BCG. Junior associates at consulting firms are motivated not with the promise of team bonuses, but rather with the threat that their individual contracts will not be renewed. Team members write peer evaluations, which the firm uses to try to identify individual talent.
In other examples, for some residential moving companies, e.g., Atlas, one team of employees does the packing and loading, then the entire team rides in the moving van to the destination, and the same team unloads and unpacks. In general, the customer can observe only whether something was broken or damaged, and not which member of the team was responsible. However, team members monitor each other closely and have opportunities to provide performance evaluations for the other members of the team. Similar examples include airplane crews and cruise ship crews. In a university setting, it is often difficult to observe directly whether a student cheats, and if two or more students turn in identical exam answers, it may be impossible to establish which student copied from which. The first-best can be achieved by requiring students not only not to cheat, but also to take steps to avoid any other student's cheating from their work. Students are typically penalized for failing to take such steps only if there is evidence that cheating has occurred.
As in Segal (1999 Segal ( , 2003 and Prat and Rustichini (2003) , we consider an environment in which the principal signs bilateral contracts with each agent separately. Since the incentives provided to an agent to complete his job assignment cannot depend directly on the choices of another agent, each agent can be held accountable only for his own actions. 3 There are a number of reasons for focusing on this environment. Joint penalties may be illegal because demotion and wage penalties are often subject to individual accountability. There are many examples in which supervisors find it difficult or impossible to sanction or dismiss an employee unless they can provide specific evidence that the individual did not fulfill his or her job assignment. 4 Union contracts commonly contain a "fire for cause agreement" that prevents the employer from firing a union member without specific cause. For example, firms employing members of the United Auto Workers are severely restricted in their ability to sanction union members. 5 Many universities and government agencies require extensive reporting and evidence before a staff member can be dismissed. 6 Italian labor law requires that in order to sanction or fire an employee, the employer must show that the employee has failed to fulfill a job assignment or violated the firm's regulations. 7 In these cases, the burden falls on the employer to prove an individual has violated the rules before penalties can be invoked.
In contrast to joint penalties, another approach to motivating agents in a team environment is joint bonuses. However, joint bonuses can be expensive for firms because base compensation is 3 This is equivalent to assuming that an individual can be held liable for a contract violation only if he is identified as the party breaching the contract. While individual liability is usually the default rule in contract and labor Law, joint and several liability may apply in some special cases. For instance, the Universal Commercial Code 3-116, regulating 'negotiable instruments' (i.e. unconditional promises or orders to pay a fixed amount of money) states that "Except as otherwise provided in the instrument, two or more persons who have the same liability on an instrument [...] are jointly and severally liable [...] ." We briefly discuss the Law and Economics literature on liability rules in Section 2. 4 In several countries of continental Europe, government-sponsored negotiations between trade unions and associations of employers (representing many corporations at the same time) prohibit individuals from being fired without elaborate due process. These centralized contracts are not limited to blue-collar jobs, but also control most white-collar industry jobs.
5 In "Agreements between UAW R°a nd the Ford Motor Company" (Vol. I, Agreements Dated October 9, 1999 (Effective Oct. 25, 1999)), Ford is severely restricted in its ability to penalize an employee who is a member of the United Auto Workers. Any action taken by Ford against a member of the UAW can be appealed through a so-called Grievance Procedure (Art. VII, section 5). As a result, Ford cannot sanction shirking behavior unless it can establish individual guilt. 6 The University of Rochester personnel policies and procedures on termination (Policy 136) allow termination based on poor work performance only if training and counseling fail. Moreover, the University cannot begin the procedures to terminate an employee without presenting its case to the Office of Human Resources.
7 Paraphrased in English, the Italian Law (Statuto dei Lavoratori, Legge 20 maggio 1970 n. 300, Art. 4, 7, and 18) states that: (i) it is forbidden to use cameras, microphones, or other any devices to monitor workers' activity; (ii) the employer must make public what constitutes an infraction and the associated sanction; (iii) the employer may not sanction any worker without formally claiming an infraction, presenting the employee with the infraction, and hearing her defense; and (iv) if sanctioned, the worker may go to trial or request arbitration, in which case the sanction is suspended until the end of the trial or arbitration.
often inflexible, and/or because joint bonuses contain an arbitrary or stochastic element, making it more expensive to compensate risk averse agents in this way. For example, union contracts and management policies often make base wages non-flexible, leaving no room for employers to motivate their employees with joint bonuses. 8 Of course, the incentive scheme that we identify is not affected by base wage inflexibility: when an agent is found shirking her individual assignment, she may be legally penalized with a salary detraction, and she may even be demoted or fired. Since commonly used instruments for bonuses, such as stock options, depend on the conduct of the entire firm, it may be difficult to tie joint bonuses to the performance of a small team, making them inefficient incentive devices for risk averse agents. To the extent that bonuses are risk free or technically equivalent to wages, one would expect them to be legally treated as wages and subject to the restrictions discussed above.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. After reviewing related literature in Section 2, we describe a simple model in Section 3, and give our main results in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 extend our results to allow uncertainty and teams of more than two agents, and Section 7 concludes. Appendix A provides a more detailed discussion of the monitoring technology, and Appendix B contains proofs omitted from the text.
Literature Review
Following the seminal work of Holmström (1982) , which shows that an efficient sharing rule for the team's output respecting ex-post budget balance does not exist, a substantial literature has studied environments of moral hazard in teams: Rasmusen (1987) studies risk-averse teams, Kandel and Lazear (1992) introduce the relevance of peer pressure, Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) and Athey and Roberts (2001) study endogenous team formation. The theoretical literature can be roughly divided into two main branches. The first deals with optimal mechanism design: Ma (1988) studies a principal multi-agent setting, Legros and Matsushima (1991) allow for asymmetry and characterize efficient sharing rules, McAfee and McMillan (1991) and Nandeibam (2002) determine that, 8 Bewley (1999) finds that wages are downwardly rigid, except possibly for the secondary sector. But even for the secondary sector, minimum wage requirements may reduce wage flexibility. At Duke University, for each job category (e.g., bus driver, bookshop assistant, roofing mechanic), there is a minimum hourly wage and a maximum hourly wage. The lowest-paid Duke employee makes $6.18 per hour. Roofing mechanics make between $13.05 and $18.00 per hour. Bus drivers make between $10.97 and $16.02 per hour. Bookshop assistants make between $9.82 and $13.75 per hour. There is not much room for variation within a pay grade, although an employee could be promoted, say from roofing mechanic to senior roofing mechanic, and then be able to earn more. Employee can be fired, but only after a detailed accounting has been made of their failings. under some conditions, optimal contracts are linear in output, and Legros and Matthews (1993) consider approximately efficient solutions. The second strand in the theoretical literature studies the repetition of the agency game: Radner (1986) studies both perfect and imperfect monitoring (see also Strausz, 1999) , Che and Yoo (2001) and Che (2002) underline the value of joint compensations, and Rayo (2003) identifies optimal policies in terms of sharing rules that depend on past output. This paper focuses on peer monitoring and is the first study, to our knowledge, to show that monitoring mechanisms play a role in achieving the first-best, even when monitoring itself is wasteful. The previous literature, started by the work of Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) , focuses on secondbest solutions. Baliga and Sjostrom (2001) study optimal peer assessments mechanisms and find a tendency for overly negative valuations, Miller (1997) considers an asymmetric joint monitoring mechanism, Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) consider the role of monitoring on group performance in an experimental setting and find monitoring elicits high effort from workers in some circumstances.
We derive a first-best incentive system in a multi-agent setting using bilateral contracts. In contrast, Segal (1999) shows that when bilateral contracts are public, inefficiencies arise due to the externalities on agents' reservation utilities; whereas when the principal's offers are privately observed, inefficiencies are due to the externalities at efficient outcomes. Inefficiencies can be eliminated if the principal can adopt a multilateral contract scheme, whereby each agents' terms of contracts depend on other agents' messages. Segal (2003) extends this model to examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from (i) coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium, and (ii) making different contracts available to different agents. The inefficiencies under different contracting regimes are shown to be typically reduced by both prohibitions. Prat and Rustichini (2003) introduce a game with multiple principals and multiple common agents, where each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action taken by that agent. They show that games with multiple principals and agents display a type of strategic inefficiency that is absent when either there is a unique principal or there is a unique agent.
Among possible institutional motivations for the empirical regularity of bilateral contracts is the provision that courts and judicial bodies usually operate under individual liability rules. Shavell (1987) provides a summary of the Law and Economics literature on liability rules. When the court is fully informed, Kornhauser and Revesz (1989) show that a variety of negligence rules implement the first-best. However, Feess and Hege (1998) show that an efficient liability rule may not exist in environments such as the one we study, where multiple agents interact in a non-separable way, there is imperfect information about their actions, and punitive damages are not feasible. Emons (1990) and Green (1976) study the case of additive separability, and Emons and Sobel (1991) the case where agents are not identical. Besides being detrimental to defendants, Revesz (1993, 1994) show that the joint and several liability rule may also be detrimental to plaintiffs because it may stifle or complicate out-of-court settlement.
A Simple Model
In this section, we present a simple, binary, deterministic model with one principal and two agents.
In later sections, we extend this model to allow for more generality, but the intuition for the main results is more easily seen in the simple model.
Each agent i chooses an action a i ∈ A = {0, 1} in a joint production process: either he exerts effort (action 1) or shirks (action 0). Let c i be the cost to agent i of exerting effort and normalize the cost of shirking to zero. The output of the joint production process π(a 1 , a 2 ) depends on both agents' actions, and may be either high, (π(a 1 , a 2 ) = h), or low (π(a 1 , a 2 ) = ). We assume that
so that the output is low if one or both of the agents shirk. We assume that c 1 + c 2 is small relative to h − so that the efficient outcome is for both agents to exert effort.
While the output π is verifiable, the agents' efforts a 1 and a 2 cannot be observed. However, at cost x i , agent i can monitor agent j (j 6 = i) and produce a verifiable report R i of j's effort. 9 We assume that effort is more costly than monitoring, i.e., c i > x i . 10 Letting m i = 1 if agent i monitors agent j and m i = 0 if he does not, we consider two alternative representations of the relation among m i , a j , and R i , allowing for differences in what can be inferred and verified about an agent's monitoring choice from the inspection of his report. 11 We first consider the case in which agent i's report reveals whether agent i monitored agent j or not, and hence the choice of monitoring is itself verifiable, as well as revealing agent j's effort 9 Our main results remain the same if one allows the principal to monitor the agents directly (at a cost). In this case, the principal strictly prefers to include monitoring in the agents' assignments rather than monitor them herself. 10 This assumption is relaxed in the Section 6. 11 For our present purposes, these reduced-form representations are sufficient. Appendix A shows how both representations can be derived from underlying assumptions about how a judicial body evaluates agents' reports about their teammates and evidence presented by agents confirming their own efforts. when agent i does monitor. Formally, for any agents i and j,
(1) When monitoring technology (1) is adopted, if R i (m i , a j ) = n, then nothing can be inferred about j's action, but it can be verified that agent i did not monitor agent j. Technology (1) is appropriate to represent a specific verifiable action by agent i that generates evidence about j's behavior. For instance, suppose that the principal requests that agent i produce a videotape of agent j's conduct at work. Then, if agent i fails to produce the videotape, the court verifies that he did not fulfill his assignment.
Second, we consider the alternative representation where, besides the amount of productive effort, the agent's choice of monitoring is also a private action, so that it cannot be directly verified.
Despite this, if agent i monitors agent j, then he is able to gather enough evidence to verify that agent j has shirked whenever, indeed, this is the case. The key difference relative to technology (1) is that under technology (2), if R i (m i , a j ) = n, i.e., agent i's report does not allow the judicial body to verify that j has shirked, then it cannot be verified whether this is because agent j worked hard, a j = 1, or because agent i did not monitor, m i = 0. Formally, for any agents i and j,
Monitoring technology (2) is appropriate to represent a process by agent i of gathering verifiable evidence on j's actions that cannot be pre-specified or described by the principal. If i's report fails to show that j shirked, it can be either because j worked hard or because i did not spend enough effort in gathering evidence. Also, this representation is appropriate to describe the request of a principal to agent i to gather all available evidence that j shirked and collect it in a report, without requesting that any evidence that j worked hard be included.
Depending on the specific environment, it may be the case that the only available monitoring technology is appropriately described with either representation (1) or (2), it may be the case that both representations are appropriate for different viable technologies, and the principal may choose to instruct agents to adopt one technology or the other.
Following the motivation laid out in the introduction, we assume that the contract between the principal and agent i cannot make agent i's compensation depend on the choices of agent j, and hence that agent i can be held accountable only for his own actions. 12
12 If this were not the case, then each agent's compensation could depend directly on the joint output, regardless Definition 1 (Individual Contracts) Each agent i's contract specifies a job assignment, consisting of a (minimum) effort levelâ i ∈ A and monitoring requirementm i ∈ M with either technology (1) or (2), and a transfer from the principal w i that is paid unless it is verified that agent i did not fulfill his assignment, in which case the transfer is w i − p i , possibly negative.
Our basic construction does not place any restrictions on p i . In principle, the contract may provide that p i > w i , so that the principal collects a net payment from agent i if he is found shirking.
But this formulation does not seem always realistic in the environments under consideration, so we introduce two further restrictions.
Assumption 1 (Limited Liability) For any agent i, p i ≤ w i .
Assumption 2 (Damage Compensation)
No agent is penalized unless π = andâ = 1.
Assumption 1 is that agents are only limitedly liable-the harshest penalty that can be imposed is to pay the agent nothing. Assumption 2 is that transfers are restricted to damage compensationthe principal is forced to pay w i to each agent i unless it is verified that she incurred a loss, i.e., that the output is low. We will show in the next section that neither of these two assumptions is required to obtain our main result, but that the details of the mechanisms and equilibria may depend on them.
We consider a three-stage game. In the first stage, the principal simultaneously proposes contracts to the two agents, and each agent i accepts his contract if it satisfies his individual-rationality constraint. In stage two, the agents choose their effort levels and whether to monitor the other agent. In stage three, the principal observes the output of the joint production process and the reports and transfers are made. Because monitoring is costly, the first-best is achieved if and only if the two agents exert effort in production without wasting resources monitoring each other.
of whether it could be verified that the agent fulfilled his job assignment or not. In such a case, the first-best can be achieved by requiring high effort from both agents and by making compensation conditional on the joint output.
Results

The Optimal Mechanism
We begin by establishing that if the principal does not include monitoring responsibility in the job assignments, then the agents shirk. Thus, the job assignment that corresponds to the first-best choices does not produce the first-best outcome. The result follows from the observation that if the principal requires high effort but no monitoring, and if output is low, the principal cannot identify which agent shirked, and so it is not verifiable whether a given agent failed to fulfill his assignment.
Proposition 1 If the principal does not include monitoring in the job assignment, then in equilibrium both agents shirk and output is low.
If the principal does not include monitoring in the job assignment, then high output cannot be achieved in equilibrium. With no one monitoring him, an agent has an incentive to shirk because the principal cannot verify which agent shirked. However, if agent i monitors agent j, then agent j is forced to exert effort to avoid being penalized. This suggests that the principal may achieve high output by requiring agents to monitor each other's effort. Comparing this result with Proposition 1,
however, it appears that only a second-best outcome may be achieved-successful joint production takes place only if the principal requires that the agents engage in costly monitoring of each other. 13 The intuition that only a second-best solution is achievable is overturned in the key result of this section. Proposition 2 below, which does not depend on whether or not transfers are limited by individual liability or damage compensation, shows that if the principal requires both agents to work hard and to monitor each other with technology (2), then the profile in which agents work hard without monitoring each other is an equilibrium and the first-best is achieved. Thus, job assignments that correspond to the second-best solution may induce the first-best outcome.
Proposition 2 The profile (a, m) = (1, 0) is an equilibrium of the subgame induced by the assignment (â i ,m i ) = (1, 1) with technology (2) and w i ≥ c i for each i.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. First, note that if an agent i chooses not to exert effort, then it will be verifiable that agent i has not fulfilled his assignment, even if agent j does not monitor agent i. Since agent i does not exert effort, production is low, and so the principal can verify that at least one of the two agents did not exert effort. If it were the case that agent i exerted effort and monitored agent j, then agent j must not have exerted effort, in which case agent i would have produced a report R i = 0. Since this is not the case, the principal verifies that agent i either did not exert effort or failed to monitor the other agent. While it cannot be verified which of the two requirements he has failed to fulfill, it is verifiable that he has not fulfilled the job assignment and so can be penalized.
Second, note that when output high, it cannot be verified whether agents monitored each other with technology (2) or not. Since output is high, both agents i worked hard, and this explains why R i = n for both i, i.e., neither agent's report can show that the other agent shirked. Hence it cannot be verified that any agent i did not attempt to gather evidence that the other agent j shirked. In sum, agents are not penalized when playing the profile (a, m) = (1, 0), but each has a lower payoff if he deviates from this profile (he is penalized if a i 6 = 1, and he incurs the cost of monitoring if m i 6 = 0), and so it is an equilibrium.
If instructing the agents to work hard and monitor each other with technology (1), the principal cannot induce the equilibrium (a, m) = (1, 0) unless transfers are restricted to damage compensation, or unless she can otherwise credibly precommit not to sanction agents when output is high. Of course, this precommitment cannot be included in the individual assignments (â,m) which depend only on each agent i's actions and cannot depend on joint output. 14 If in fact agent i works hard (a i = 1) without monitoring agent j (m i = 0) , then the principal can verify that j did not monitor because R j = n. This implies that the principal prefers to instruct agents to use technology (2) rather than technology (1), so as to save the cost of compensating the agents for monitoring each other.
When transfers are restricted to damage compensation, however, it can be shown that technologies (1) and (2) yield identical incentives to the agents anytime that the principal requests that they work hard.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, i.e., transfers are restricted to damage compensation, for any profile (a, m) , agent i is penalized whenâ i = 1 under technology (1) if and only if he is penalized under technology (2).
14 One further possibility could be that the principal chooses not to penalize agents when output is high because of reputational concerns.
We conclude this section with Proposition 3, which combines the results of Proposition 2 and Lemma 1 and notes that the equilibrium of Proposition 2 is unique under the commonplace "weak implementation" restriction that agents coordinate on the principal's preferred equilibrium in each subgame (intuitively, the principal instructs each agent to play her most preferred equilibrium, and neither agent has any reason to deviate from his instructions if the other agent follows his own instructions). 15 Proposition 3 If the agents coordinate on the principal's preferred equilibrium in each subgame, and if either (i) technology (2) is used or (ii) technology (1) is used and transfers are restricted to damage compensation, then in the unique equilibrium, the principal assigns (â,m) = (1, 1) and w = c, and agents choose (a, m) = (1, 0). The first-best is achieved and the principal captures all gains.
Equilibrium Uniqueness and Limited Liability
In the above subsection, we characterize the optimal mechanism under the assumption that agents play the principal's most preferred equilibrium. We now complete the equilibrium description. As in Proposition 3, we focus the analysis on either technology (2) only, or on both technologies (1) and (2) under Assumption 2 (damage compensation).
Depending on parameters, the equilibrium (a, m) = (1, 0) is not necessarily unique in the subgame following the assignments (â,m) = (1, 1) with c ≤ w ≤ c + x. If p i ≤ w i + x i , there are also two pure-strategy equilibria, symmetric to each other, in which agent i chooses (a i , m i ) = (0, 0) , agent j chooses (a j , m j ) = (0, 1) , and output is low. But if p i > w i + x i , then these profiles cannot be equilibria: if agent j chooses (a j , m j ) = (0, 1) , agent i prefers to monitor and work hard, in which case he avoids being penalized. Thus, if agents can commit to pay substantial penalties off the equilibrium path, then the equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is unique.
is sufficiently small relative to h − , then in the unique equilibrium, the principal assigns (â,m) = (1, 1) , with w = c, and agents choose (a, m) = (1, 0) .
In the environments of interest, it is natural to assume that agents have limited liability, and that, at worst, the principal can refuse payment, i.e., p i ≤ w i . In this case, there is a continuum of Pareto-optimal equilibria in which compensation is such that c ≤ w ≤ c + x. 16 The only effect of limited liability constraints is potentially to shift rents from the principal to the agents.
is small enough relative to h − , then the principal assigns (â,m) = (1, 1) , with w ∈ [c, c + x], and the agents choose (a, m) = (1, 0). The Pareto frontier is achieved, but agents may collect rents.
An interesting question is whether assignments that, if fulfilled, would impose costs on the agents that are larger than their compensation would be allowed in the environments under consideration.
If the principal makes a job assignment whose costs are disproportionate relative to an agent's compensation, it may not be possible for the principal to enforce the contract. In particular, a judicial body may not allow an agent to be penalized even if it verifies that he did not fulfill his assignment. We refer to an assignment (â i ,m i ) as "overburdening" ifâ i c i +m i x i > w i . We show that if such assignments are illegal, then the equilibrium is unique and Pareto efficient. However, the agents capture the rent related to the monitoring costs x i , for which they are compensated in the contract, but which they do not incur on the equilibrium path.
Proposition 6 If overburdening assignments are illegal, then the principal assigns (â,m) = (1, 1) with w = c + x, and the agents choose (a, m) = (1, 0).
Noisy Outcomes
The model of Section 3 assumes that output and reports are deterministic. To explore the robustness of our results, we extend our environment to stochastic monitoring and output. 17 Although in some models, such as that of Bagwell (1995) , small amounts of noise in monitoring can dramatically affect equilibrium outcomes, we find that in our model this is not the case.
We assume that output is observed correctly with probability 1 − ε, specifically Pr(π = | a = 1) = ε and Pr(π = h | a 6 = 1) = ε, and we assume reports correctly reflect agents' actions with probability 1 − 2δ. Hence technologies (1) and (2), respectively, yield: 16 Because agents may not coordinate on the principal's favored equilibrium in some subgames, the principal may be forced to offer compensation greater than c.
17 Feess and Hege (1998) study the efficiency of liability rules in a model with noisy monitoring.
We assume that the output π and the agents' reports R are made available to a judicial body that holds a non-degenerate prior p over the actions of the agents. Agent i is penalized if the judicial body's posterior probability that agent i did not fulfill his job assignment (â i ,m i ) is greater than the fixed threshold P ∈ (1/2, 1), which defines the judicial body's "standard of proof." For any ε and δ, the updating with respect to agent's i choice (a i , m i ) is as follows:
.
We assume that the judicial body's prior p is restricted so that agent i is not penalized when the principal does not produce evidence that agent i did not fulfill his job assignment (â i ,m i ) . Loosely speaking, this may be interpreted as assuming that the burden of proof is on the principal to show that an agent shirked. In order to capture this restriction, we assume that the prior probability of each action profile in which i fulfilled his assignment is large relative to P and to the probability of any profile in which i does not fulfill his assignment. 18
Definition 2 The profile (p, P ) is B-admissible if for any (â i ,m i ), and (a, m) such that
In Appendix B, Lemma B.1 singles out a few important characteristics of admissible priors.
Intuitively, as noise increases, the judicial body's standard of proof is less easily met. An agent 18 It is not enough to assume that the prior probability that agent i fulfilled her assignment is large because the verifiable outcomes (π, R) depend also on agent j's actions, and hence Pr (â i ,m i | π, R; ε, δ) is not uniquely defined given p(âi,mi). For example, consider technology (2), let p (ai, mi; aj, mj) = p a j m j a i m i , and suppose that (âi,mi) = (1, 1) . The judicial body should not let agent i be sanctioned when (π, R) = ( ; 0, n) because the output is low, but i shows that j shirked. The judicial body also should not let agent i be sanctioned when (π, R) = (h; n, n); in this case, since output is high, it is likely that both agents worked hard, and this explains why neither of them can show that the opponent shirked. Nevertheless, considering small noise for simplicity, 
is less easily penalized with the same evidence if his requirement is less restrictive. With both technologies (1) and (2), if output is low and an agent i fails to show that j shirked, i can be penalized if and only if his assignment was both to work hard and monitor. As in the noiseless case, with technology (2), agent i cannot be penalized when output is high and his report fails to show that j shirked.
For brevity, we consider the (most relevant) case in which agents are limitedly liable, and we assume that the principal is able to coordinate the agents on her preferred equilibrium. For future reference, we introduce the indicator function
which represents the outcome of a hearing concerning agent i's conduct.
Proposition 7 below shows that with technology (2), in equilibrium, either the principal gives up providing incentives, or requires both agents to work hard and monitor. As shown in the proof, when an agent i is required to work hard, given that the opponent chooses to work hard, the choice m i = 1 is strictly dominated by m i = 0, as it does not change the likelihood of being penalized. By settingâ = 1 and large enough compensations w, the principal can motivate each agent i to work hard. As long as noise is low enough that each agent i can be penalized when output is low and he fails to show that j shirked (χ ( , n, n) = 1), the principal prefers the assignmentm = 1 overm = 0 because it facilitates sanctioning the agents in case the output is low. When χ ( , n, n) = 0, instead, agents can be penalized for the same outcomes (π, R) regardless ofm, so that the assignments (â,m) = (1, 1) and (â,m) = (1, 0) practically coincide.
Of course, with high levels of noise, the judicial body's standard of proof can never be met. In such a case, agents can never be penalized for failing to fulfill their job assignments, and so cannot be induced to exert effort or to monitor.
Proposition 7 Given technology (2), for all B-admissible profiles (p,P ) with B large enough, the principal assigns (â,m) = (1, 1) and compensation w that induce the agents to choose (a, m) =
(1, 0) as long as the noise parameters ε and δ are not too large; when the noise is large, the principal provides no incentives and the agents choose (a, m) = (0, 0) .
The analysis is more complex with technology (1), which we study when transfers are restricted to damage compensation, as in Proposition 3. When signals are too noisy, again, the agents choose (a, m) = (0, 0) because they cannot be penalized. When ε and δ are not too large, the principal can induce choices (a, m) = (1, 0) with the assignment (â,m) = (1, 0) , but the assignment (â,m) = (1, 1) , although it induces effort, a = 1, may lead to wasteful monitoring, m 6 = 0. Agents will choose m = 0 unless χ i ( , 1, R j ) = 1 > χ i ( , n, R j ) = 0 for some R j , i.e., unless the judicial body allows agent i to be penalized when observing that he did not monitor, but not when output is low and his report shows that agent j worked hard. This is the case only if output is noisier than monitoring, as long as neither is too noisy, nor too precise. As long as monitoring is noisier than output, or both are precise enough, we show that the principal assigns (â,m) = (1, 1) and agents choose the first-best outcome (a, m) = (1, 0) . We conclude this section by studying the principal's choice between monitoring technologies.
As is the case without noise, when transfers are not restricted to damage compensation, she prefers that agents adopt technology (2), because this allows her to precommit not to penalize agents when output is high. When transfers are restricted to damage compensation, we have shown that the principal can always induce (a, m) = (1, 0) by assigning (â,m) = (1, 1) with technology (2). We now show that this dominates inducing (a, m) = (1, 0) by assigning (â,m) = (1, 0) with technology (1), unless the two mechanisms yield the same incentives.
When the monitoring costs x are small relative to the production costs c and output is noisier than monitoring, but neither is too noisy nor too precise (so that agents are penalized when π = and R = (n, n) if and only if technology (1) is adopted), 19 the principal may choose (â,m) = (1, 1) with technology (1), even if this may cause agents monitor on the equilibrium path. This happens because agents can cheaply avoid being penalized by monitoring, and this has no impact on the incentive-compatible wage. But apart from this rather special parameter range, in equilibrium, the principal assigns (â,m) = (1, 1) and the agents choose (a, m) = (1, 0) on the equilibrium path.
Hence the main results of Section 4 extend.
Proposition 9 When transfers are restricted to damage compensation, for all B-admissible profiles (p,P ) with B sufficiently large and all (ε, δ) , the principal prefers to assign (â,m) = (1, 1) with technology (2), hence inducing equilibrium (a, m) = (1, 0), over assigning (â,m) = (1, 0) with technology (1). The principal prefers inducing an equilibrium different from (a, m) = (1, 0) over assigning (â,m) = (1, 1) with technology (2) only if x i is sufficiently small relative to c i for both i = 1, 2, and the noise parameters (ε, δ) are such that χ i ( , 1, 0) = 1, χ i ( , 1, n) = 0, χ i ( , n, n) = 1, with technology (1), and χ i ( , n, n) = 0 with technology (2).
Large Teams
This section extends the analysis of Section 4 to allow for any finite number of agents and actions.
As in Section 5, we assume agents coordinate on the principal's preferred equilibrium in each subgame. Our results hold under both unlimited and limited liability. Let I ≥ 2 be the set of agents, indexed by i. Each agent has utility
, where w i is the compensation, m i ∈ × j6 =i {0, 1} is the vector of monitoring choices, and a i ∈ A is the productive effort by i, with a ≡ min A. We allow for general cost functions: c i (a i ) is the cost of effort, increasing in a i , and x i (m i ) is the cost of monitoring, where x i (0) = 0 and x i is strictly increasing in m i . We extend the monitoring representations (1) and (2) in the following, natural way: For any agents i and j, respectively,
In equilibrium, each agent i join the team if and only if her participation constraint is satisfied:
The output is given by the production function π (a) , where we impose anonymity, i.e., we assume that π is invariant to permutations of the agents' actions. Let a * be the (assumed unique, for expositional simplicity) socially optimal outcome, i.e., a * ∈ arg max
To rule out trivial solutions, we assume a * i > a for any i. For future reference, we let
denote the social value of the optimal agents' effort.
As in the case of two agents, the principal cannot achieve high effort by means of job assignments that do not require monitoring. But unlike the two-agent case, the extent of the monitoring requirements necessary to achieve the first-best depends on the monitoring technology. Specifically, we show that the monitoring requirements inducing high output are more demanding when technology (2) is adopted-output π (a * ) is achieved only if the principal requires every agent to monitor every other agent. As in the previous section, in equilibrium the agents exert effort, but do not monitor each other, so that the first-best is achieved.
Proposition 10 Given technology (4), the profile a * is achieved with probability one in equilibrium if and only if the principal's job assignment to each agent i is (â i ,m i ) = (a * i , 1) with w i ≥ c i (a * i ); in this case, each agent i chooses m i = 0, and hence the first-best is achieved.
While it may seem infeasible to require each agent to monitor every other agent, this requirement is not carried out on the equilibrium path. In fact, this equilibrium always exists, regardless of the value of the monitoring cost functions x i . When overburdening assignments are illegal, however, we obtain an impossibility result for the case of large teams, because in a team of n members, each agent is required to monitor all remaining n − 1 team members in order to achieve the first-best, and the principal is required to compensate the agents also for these monitoring efforts. Hence the burden laid out in the assignments grows quickly in the size of the team, while the principal's net benefit from achieving the first-best need not grow as fast. For simplicity, the following Proposition focuses on linear monitoring costs.
Proposition 11
Suppose that x i (m i ) = x P j6 =i m ij for every i, and that V (n) grows slower than quadratically in n. Then for n sufficiently large, it is unprofitable to provide incentives with technology (4) when overburdening assignments are illegal.
When the monitoring technology (1) is adopted, the principal may achieve the first-best only if transfers are restricted to damage compensation. In this case, it is not necessary to request that agents monitor every other agent. Agents can be induced to exert effort by requiring them to monitor sufficiently many other agents that the monitoring assignment is more costly to fulfill than the effort assignment. In order to avoid the penalty, each agent prefers to exert effort rather than monitoring.
Proposition 12 When transfers are restricted to damage compensation, the profile a * is achieved with probability one in equilibrium with technology (3), if and only ifâ i = a * i and either x i (m i ) ≥ c i (a * i ) orm i = 1, with wage w i ≥ c i (a * i ) ; in both cases, each agent i chooses m i = 0, and hence the first-best is achieved.
While in the previous sections, we have identified reasons why technology (2) is preferable to technology (1), in this section we identify one special case in which the reverse is true. If transfers are restricted to damage compensation and overburdening assignments are illegal, then technology (1) may be preferable to technology (2) when the team size is large enough. Unlike technology (2), it allows the principal profitably to give the agents incentive to work hard, regardless of team size.
For simplicity, the following Proposition focuses on linear symmetric costs, and on linear output.
Proposition 13 Even if overburdening assignments are illegal, the profile a * can be achieved in equilibrium with technology (3) if there is a profile (m i ) i∈I such that x i (m i ) ≥ c i (a * i ) for every i, and P i∈I x i (m i ) ≤ V, which is the case if c i and x i are constant in i, x i is linear in P j6 =i m ij , and V (n) grows linearly in n.
Conclusion
We consider a team production problem in which the principal observes only the group output and not individual effort, but in which agents are only individually accountable, so that the principal's compensation of each agent cannot depend on other agents' actions. In this environment, agents have incentives to shirk, but we show that by including monitoring in the agents' job assignments, the principal induces the agents to exert effort. Moreover, even though equilibrium job assignments include monitoring, this serves only to provide incentives for effort. Therefore, agents do not engage in wasteful monitoring in equilibrium, and the first-best is achieved.
Our analysis has also shown that this result is robust in that it holds with different representations of the monitoring technology and under various restrictions of the transfers between each agent and the principal. Furthermore, we have shown that the result is essentially unaffected when monitoring and output are observed with some noise. When large teams are considered, our results identify a novel rationale for why incentives may become more difficult to deliver as teams become larger. This occurs because the required monitoring activity may become very costly and, even if not undertaken on the equilibrium path, assignments may be legally constrained not to be disproportionate relative to compensations.
At the methodological level, our analysis describes an environment in which the standard approach to solving contract and implementation problems fail-while the contract prescribing the first-best fails to induce the desired outcome, the first-best can be achieved with a contract prescribing second-best actions, with which the agents do not comply in equilibrium. We emphasize that, in order to achieve desired actions, the agents should not restrict attention to contracts under which they commit to choose these actions. Instead, they may need to consider "roundabout," apparently contradictory mechanisms, in which they publicly commit to choose different actions, with the secret agreement that the contracts will be violated so as to achieve the optimal outcome.
A Appendix: Monitoring Technologies Revisited
In this section, we revisit the monitoring technologies presented in the main body of the paper and show how they can be derived from more primitive assumptions in an environment in which agents produce reports reviewed by a judicial body.
While output π is verifiable, we assume the agents' choices a i and m i are private actions, and hence cannot be observed by the judicial body. However, we allow each agent i to report on the performance of other agents. For the purposes of this section, we assume that each report can either contain hard evidence or consist only of cheap talk. The action of gathering hard evidence is costly.
Specifically, agent i can monitor agent j's effort and produce a hard-evidence report at cost x ij .
We denote this choice by agent i by m ij = 1. We denote agent i's choice to produce a cheap-talk report on agent j's effort by m ij = 0. Formally, each report consists of a pair (m ij , r ij ) , where the first component m ij identifies the quality of the report, and the second component r ij identifies the content of the report: agent i claims that agent j has taken effort a j = r ij . We assume that it is impossible to produce a hard-evidence report contrary to the facts: if m ij = 1, then r ij = a j .
One way to motivate our assumptions on the monitoring technologies is to assume that after the project's output is determined, the principal collects all agents' reports. If she wishes to sanction any agent i, she must bring i's case before a judicial body. The principal may present the output π and reports (r jk , m jk ) for any j and k. In defense, each agent i may present his own report (r ii , m ii ) on his productive effort. The burden of proof is on the principal to show that agent i did not fulfill his assignment. In order to simplify the exposition, we assume that it is never the case that r ii = 0, i.e. that player i never produces a self-implicating report in which he takes the blame for low output.
The judicial body allows agent i to be penalized if and only if it can conclude that a i <â i or m i <m i , against the presumption that (a i , m i ) ≥ (â i ,m i ). Before the judicial body takes its decision, all reports presenting contradicting claims are compared. We assume that hard-evidence reports defeat cheap-talk reports in the analysis of the judicial board, and that in the case that all reports are cheap talk, agent i's claim that he fulfilled his assignment stands and he cannot be penalized. 20 Specifically, for any i, we introduce the concept of aggregate evidence claim r i ∈ {0, 1}, where r i = r ii if m ji = 0 for all j, and r i = r ji if there is a j such that m ji = 1. 21 While we assume the judicial body can weigh the evidence contained in contradicting reports, we do not assume that it is necessarily able to determine how much effort was required in preparing a report. We distinguish two possibilities. We show that, on the one hand, assuming technology (1) is equivalent to assuming that the judicial body can directly observe m jk in any report (r jk , m jk ).
On the other hand, assuming technology (2) is equivalent to assuming that the judicial body cannot directly determine m jk in any report (r jk , m jk ), but bases its decision only on the verifiable output π and on the aggregate evidence claim r i .
Lemma A.1 Assuming technology (1) is equivalent to saying that the judicial body bases its conclusions on π and on (r jk , m jk ) for any j, k; whereas assuming technology (2) is equivalent to saying that the judicial body bases its conclusions on π and on r i for all i.
Proof. Suppose the court does not observe m ij . By construction, r j = 0 if and only if m ij = 1 for some j and a i = 0, hence the result is obtained by setting R i (m i , a j ) = r j . Suppose the judicial body observes (r ij , m ij ). If m ij = 1, then r ij = a j ; whereas if instead m ij = 0, then r ij does not contain any hard evidence on a j . Hence setting R i (m i , a j ) = n when m ij = 0, and R i (m i , a j ) = r ij when m ij = 1 summarizes all information of (m ij , r ij ) with respect to m i and a j . Q.E.D.
In order to conclude the discussion, we explore the possibility that the first-best is achieved if each agent is required to work hard and to produce verifiable evidence proving that he has not shirked. We will show that (i) this is the case only with technology (1), and (ii) this mechanism is unlikely to be viable in the environments under consideration. Proof. If the judicial body observes m ii , it will allow the principal to sanction i unless m ii = 1, but in this case r ii = a i and hence the judicial body allows the principal to sanction i unless a i = 1.
Sincem ji = 0 for any i, j, m ji = 0, and hence r i = 1. If the judicial body does not observe m ii , the only evidence is π = and r i = 1, so the judicial body must allow for the possibility that (a i , m ii ) = (1, 1), and so will not allow agent i to be penalized. Q.E.D. 20 The theoretical properties of related mechanisms are studied, for instance, in Lipman and Seppi (1995) . Müller and Wärneryd (2001) consider a model of firm ownership in which conflicts between insider and outsiders to the firm are resolved by appeal to a legal system. Prendergast (1993) considers incentives in an environment in which agents need not report their observations honestly. 21 Note that by construction all hard-evidence reports must agree.
When technology (2) is adopted, absent any additional evidence, the judicial body will not be able to conclude that i's report m ii = 1 is cheap talk, and hence will not allow agent i to be penalized. The key difference in Lemma 2 is that the requirement to monitor the other agent induces a conflict between the agents that would generate conflicting evidence in case of a hearing, and help the inference of the judicial body on the agents' monitoring effort.
When technology (1) is adopted, instead, requiring an agent to work hard and to produce a hard-evidence report that his effort was high achieves high effort. But on the other hand, this mechanism is unlikely to be viable in the environments in which we are interested. Suppose that agent i is assigned the task (â i ,m ii ) = (1, 1) and that the principal accuses agent i of not having fulfilled his job assignment. Under the assignment (â i ,m ii ) = (1, 1), the agent is penalized unless he can gather and present evidence that he worked hard. This hearing is logically equivalent to a hearing in which agent i is accused of having played a i = 0, and is penalized unless he proves that he has played a i = 1, against the presumption that he has played a i = 0. In such a hearing, the burden of the proof is borne by agent i, contrary to the basic principles of the environments under consideration. This can be avoided only if the job assignment (â i ,m ii ) = (1, 1) is ruled out. In particular, an assignment requiring an agent both to work hard and to prove that he has worked hard does not seem plausible in the economic environments of interest. or (a i , m i , a j ) = (0, 1, 1), i.e., he shirks, output is low, and he reports that the opponent worked hard. This implies that agent i's choice m i either does not affect whether he is penalized, or, when (a i , a j ) = (0, 1) and technology (1) is adopted, choosing m i = 1 causes the agent to be penalized when he would not have had he chosen m i = 0. Since monitoring is costly, it follows that m i = 0 in equilibrium. This, together with the (obvious) result that if (â j ,m j ) = (0, 0) then (a j , m j ) = (0, 0), implies that m i = m j = 0 in equilibrium regardless ofâ j . As a result (both with technology (1) and with technology (2)) agent i cannot be penalized for a i = 0 in equilibrium. Since effort is costly, it follows that agent i chooses a i = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We begin by proving the following claim: if the principal observes low output and R i 6 = 0, then it is verifiable that (a i , m i ) 6 = (1, 1). To see this, suppose output is low and R i 6 = 0, and let j 6 = i. Since R i 6 = 0, then the principal can verify that (m i , a j ) 6 = (1, 0). At the same time, since output is low, the principal can verify that (a i , a j ) 6 = (1, 1). If a i = 1, then the second conclusion implies that a j = 0, but in such a case, the first conclusion implies that m i = 0.
Thus, the principal can verify that (a i , m i ) 6 = (1, 1).
Continuing the proof, assume (â 1 ,m 1 ) = (â 2 ,m 2 ) = (1, 1) and (a j , m j ) = (1, 0). If agent i 6 = j chooses (a i , m i ) = (1, 0), then output is high, no agent is penalized, and agent i's payoff is −c i . A deviation by agent i to (a i , m i ) = (1, 1) gives payoff −c i − x i , and so is not profitable. If agent i deviates and chooses (a i , m i ) = (0, 0), then output is low and R i = n, so using the claim, the principal can verify that (a i , m i ) 6 = (1, 1) and penalizes agent i, making the deviation unprofitable.
If agent i deviates and chooses (a i , m i ) = (0, 1), then output is low and R i = n, so once again the claim implies that the principal can verify that (a i , m i ) 6 = (1, 1) and can penalize agent i, making the deviation unprofitable. Q.E.D. Proof of Proposition 3. The proof follows immediately and hence is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose (â i ,m i ) = (1, 1) for each i. Proceeding by contradiction, suppose that in an equilibrium an arbitrary agent j chooses a j = 0. In such a case, the output is low, and we show that the best response of agent i 6 = j must be such that m i = 1, and hence R i = 0. If agent i chooses (a i , m i ) = (1, 1), agent i cannot be penalized: in this case, (depending on m j and whether technology (1) or (2) is used) either R j = 1 or R j = n, so the principal cannot rule out Suppose now that m i = 1. If a j = 0, then R i = 0, and it is verifiable that a j = 0 <â j . If instead agent j chooses (a j , m j ) = (1, 1), then he cannot be penalized. This implies that j's best response to m i = 1 must be such that a j = 1.
The above arguments show that in equilibrium it must be the case that a 1 = a 2 = 1, and thus that π(a 1 , a 2 ) = h, regardless of m 1 and m 2 . Suppose now by contradiction that there is an equilibrium in which m i = 1 for some i. Since in such an equilibrium π(a 1 , a 2 ) = h, agent i is not penalized, regardless of m i . Hence i will deviate and choose m i = 0.
When the principal assigns (â i ,m i ) = (1, 0) to each agent i, we have already established that each agent i chooses a i = 0, and thus output is low. It is immediate that assigningâ i = 0 to either agent induces a i = 0, and thus output is low. Thus, we are left to consider only the subgame associated with the assignments (â j ,m j ) = (1, 1) and (â i ,m i ) = (1, 0). We show that in any equilibrium of this subgame, it must be the case that Pr(π(a) = h) < 1 (in this subgame there are no pure-strategy equilibria).
Consider is (a i , m i ) = (0, 0). Since m j = 0, it follows that R i = n, and thus the principal cannot rule out a i = 1. Sincem i = 0, agent i cannot be penalized for choosing m i = 0. This concludes the proof that there cannot be an equilibrium in which a i = a j = 1 with probability one.
In conclusion, we have by assumption,
and by individual rationality,
2)
The only subgame for which Pr(π(a) = h) = 1 in equilibrium is the one following the assignment (â i ,m i ) = (1, 1) for each agent i. This is preferred to obtaining an equilibrium with Pr(π(a) = h) < 1 in the agent game because, in such a case, the principal's expected payoff is:
where the first inequality uses (B.2) and the second inequality uses (B.1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Preliminarily, note that under Assumption 1, the principal optimally sets p i = w i for each i. First, note that in equilibrium, the principal can achieve π = h with positive probability only by assigningâ i = 1 to at least one agent i. Second, supposing that (â,m) = (1, 1) , the agents' subgame is:
It is immediate to see that when w i > c i + x i , then (a, m) = (1, 0) is the unique equilibrium, whereas if w i < c i + x i , there is an equilibrium in which (a j , m j ) = (0, 0) and (a i , m i ) = (0, 1) .
Third, supposing that (â 1 ,m 1 ) = (1, 1) and (â 2 ,m 2 ) = (1, 0), the agents' subgame is
Case (i). w 1 ∈ (c 1 , c 1 + x 1 ). Regardless of whether w 2 > c 2 + x 2 or w 2 < c 2 + x 2 , the strategies , and hence Pr(π = ) = 1.
Thus, the principal prefers to assign w 1 = w 2 = 0.
Case (ii). w 1 > c 1 + x 1 . Regardless of whether w 2 > c 2 + x 2 or w 2 < c 2 + x 2 , the strategies Simple but tedious algebra shows that, as long as h − is sufficiently large relative to the agents' costs P 2 i=1 c i + x i , for any w 1 and w 2 , (B.3) is less than h −
, which is the payoff achieved by assigning (â,m) = (1, 1) and w = x + c. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6 If overburdening assignments are illegal, the principal can assign (â i ,m i ) = (1, 1) if and only if w i ≥ c i + x i . Following the same arguments as in Proposition 5, this dominates any other assignments as long as h − is sufficiently large relative to
Lemma B.1 There is a uniform boundB such that for all B >B and all B-admissible profiles (p,P ) , any assignment (â i ,m i ) and any verifiable outcomes (π, R) , and both technologies (2) and
is non-increasing in ε and δ, χ ε,δ i (π, R;â i ,m i ) = 0 when ε and δ are sufficiently large, χ
1,m i = 0) = 0 for any ε and δ, and χ ε,δ i ( , (n, n);â i = 1,m i = 1) = 1 when ε and δ are sufficiently small. Furthermore, with technology (2), χ ε,δ i (h, (n, n);â i = 1,m i = 1) = 0 for any ε and δ.
Proof. The first two claims follow immediately by monotonicity and continuity of the Bayes' rule.
For any π, R;â i ,m for which we claim that lim (ε,δ)→0 χ ε,δ i (π, R;â i ,m i ) = 1, and any full support prior p,
For anyâ i ,m i , π, R for which we claim that χ
2 , hence:
as long as (p, P ) is B-admissible, with B sufficiently large. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. The principal chooses assignments (â,m) and transfers w, p so as to induce an equilibrium (a, m) in the agents' subgame to maximize her expected profit
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints u i (a, m) ≥ u i (a 0 i , m 0 i ; a j , m j ) for any a 0 i , m 0 i , and the individual rationality constraint u i (a, m) + w i ≥ 0 for each agent i. Clearly, under Assumption 1, the principal optimally sets p i = w i . The principal can guarantee herself the profit Π = Π ((â,m) = (0, 0) ; w = 0) by choosing not to provide incentives to the agents.
Simplifying notation slightly, given assignments (â,m) and transfers w, for any profile (a, m) , agent i's expected utility is:
Clearly, agent i finds no reason to play a i = 1 whenâ i = 0; hence we suppose thatâ i = 1 for both i. It is key to notice that if player j plays a j = 1, then regardless of m j , agent i's monitoring choice m i has no effect on the realization of π and R, because in this case R i is independent of m i . Since
then regardless of the assignmentm i , for any a i and m j
This shows that (a, m) = (1, 0) is the only possible agents' subgame equilibrium where a = 1, that the incentive-compatibility constraint u i (1, 0) ≥ u i (1, 1; 1, 0) is always satisfied, and that
For any assignmentsâ,m, the individual rationality constraint
is less stringent than the incentive-compatibility constraint
because it is easily shown that A > B.
In sum, the principal can induce a = 1 only by assigningâ = 1 to obtain (a, m) = (1, 0) , and can disregard any constraint other than u i (1, 0) ≥ u i (0, 0; 1, 0). when χ i ( , n, n;â i = 1,m i = 1) = 1 and χ i ( , n, n;â i = 1,m i = 0) = 0; note that this occurs for ε and δ sufficiently small.
The failure of the constraint set determined by the inequalities Π ((â,m) = (1, 1) ; w) ≥Π, 0, 0; 1, 0) , and u i (1, 0) + w i ≥ 0 for both i, determines for which ε and δ incentives are not provided in equilibrium. By Lemma B.1, χ ε,δ i (π, R) is non-increasing in ε, δ, and when ε and δ are sufficiently large, χ ε,δ i (h, R) = χ ε,δ i ( , R) = 0 for any R: incentives become impossible in equilibrium, because the strategy (a i , m i ) = (0, 0) is strictly dominant for both i. Conversely, when ε and δ are sufficiently small, the principal optimally chooses to provide incentives so that the agents play a = 1 in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. Preliminarily, notice that, as in the proof of Proposition 7, if ε and δ are sufficiently large, then incentives become impossible in equilibrium and agents play (a, m) = (0, 0) .
We first show that if χ i ( , R) = 1 for some R, then the principal can induce (1, 0) as an equilibrium with assignment (â,m) = (1, 0) and w sufficiently large, and with (â,m) = (1, 1) she can induce one or more of the following three equilibria: (1, 0) or (1, 1) or (a, m) = (1, 0; 1, 1).
For any B-admissible profiles (p,P ) , with B large enough, if χ i ( , R) = 1 for some R, then χ i ( , n, 0) = 1. Furthermore, it is easily seen that ifâ i = 1, then χ i ( , R 1 , 0) ≥ χ i ( , R 1 , n) ≥ χ i ( , R 1 , 1) , if (â i ,m i ) = (1, 0) , then χ i ( , 1, R 2 ) ≥ χ i ( , n, R 2 ) ≥ χ i ( , 0, R 2 ) , and if (â i ,m i ) = (1, 1) , then χ i ( , n, R 2 ) ≥ χ i ( , 1, R 2 ) ≥ χ i ( , 0, R 2 ) .
Pick any arbitrary (δ, ε) and (â i ,m i ) such thatâ i = 1 and χ i ( , 1, R 2 ) ≥ χ i ( , n, R 2 ) for all R 2 . As long as ε < 1/2 and δ < 1/4, it is possible to set w i large enough so that the following incentivecompatibility constraints are satisfied: is the optimal contract.
Analogously, for any pair (ε, δ) such that both contracts (â,m) = (1, 0) and (â,m) = (1, 1)
induce χ i ( , 1, R 2 ) = χ i ( , n, R 2 ) for all R 2 , direct inspection of inequalities (B.8)-(B.10) shows that (unless she choosesâ = 0) the principal assigns (â,m) = (1, 1) and induces (a, m) = (1, 0).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9. For any k = 1, 2, let χ k i (π, R) denote the indicator χ i (π, R) when technology (k) is adopted. Inequality (B.7) is the only binding constraint required to induce (a, m) = (1, 0) with (â,m) = (1, 1) and technology (2), whereas (B.9) is one of the constraints to induce (a, m) = (1, 0) with (â,m) = (1, 0) and technology (1). For any δ such that χ 2 i ( , n, n) = 1, simple algebra shows that (B.7) is less demanding than (B.9), whereas the two constraints coincide if χ 2 i ( , n, n) = 0, because this implies that χ 1 i ( , 1, n) = 0. This shows that the principal always prefers to assign (â,m) = (1, 1) with technology (2), over assigning (â,m) = (1, 0) with technology (1).
Second, we show that, with technology (1), if for both i = 1, 2, x i is small enough relative to c i , then the principal prefers (â,m) = (1, 1) over (â,m) = (1, 0) . Say that x i = 0 and that the assignment (â,m) = (1, 1) induces an equilibrium (a, m) . Then, the constraint u i (a, m) ≥ u i (0, 1; a j , m j ) is at least as tight as u i (a, m) ≥ u i (0, 0; a j , m j ) , because i is at least as easily penalized when (a i , m i ) = (0, 0) as when (a i , m i ) = (0, 1) , and hence u i (0, 1; a j , m j ) + x i ≥ u i (0, 0; a j , m j ) . By inspection, the constraint u i (1, m) ≥ u i (0, 1; 1, m j ) under the assignment (â,m) = (1, 1) , see inequality (B.10) and (B.13) , is satisfied with a smaller compensation w i than the constraint u i (1, 0) ≥ u i (0, 1; 1, 0) under (â,m) = (1, 0) , see inequality (B.10) , and the assignment (â,m) = (1, 1) allows the principal to penalize agents more often than the assignment (â,m) = (1, 0) .
From the proof of Proposition 8, we know that agents play (a, m) = (1, 1) under the assignment (â,m) = (1, 1) with technology (1) only if 0 = χ 1 i ( , 1, R 2 ) < χ 1 i ( , n, R 2 ) = 1 for some R 2 . The only possible case is thus χ 1 i ( , 1, 0) = 1 > χ 1 i ( , 1, n) = 0 < χ 1 i ( , n, n) = 1, with χ 2 i ( , n, n) = 0, because if χ 1 i ( , 1, 1) = 0 < χ 1 i ( , n, 1) = 1, then χ 1 i ( , 1, n) = 1 and hence χ 2 i ( , n, n) = 1. We conclude by determining when the principal may prefer to induce (a, m) = (1, 1) with technology (1) over (a, m) = (1, 0) with technology (2). The constraint (B.11) is weaker than (B.7)
only if x i is small enough. For both constraints (B.11) and (B.13) to be weaker than (B.7), it must be the case that χ 2 i ( , n, n) = 0, χ 1 i ( , n, 0) = 1 and χ 1 i ( , 1, 0) = 1. The requirement that χ 1 i ( , 1, 0) = 1 follows from χ 1 i ( , n, 0) ≥ χ 1 i ( , 1, 0) . Q.E.D. necessary to assign (â i ,m i ) = (a 0 i , 1). If overburdening assignments are illegal, it is required that w i = c (a 0 i ) + P j6 =i x ijmij , so that the principal's profit is:
